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LIABILITY FOR BULLYING AT SCHOOLS IN AUSTRALIA:  
LESSONS STILL TO BE LEARNT 
 
Professor Des Butler1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite the implementation of a wide variety of intervention initiatives, the experience 
of bullying is common for children in schools in Western societies, whether 
experienced as a victim, bully, onlooker or combination of the three. Bullying 
behaviour has been seen as occurring in a broad range of socio-economic groups 
and across urban and rural settings.2  In addition, bullying may be experienced 
irrespective of the child‟s age, physical attractiveness, or socio-economic status.3  
Although prevalence estimates may vary according to the data collection methods 
used, a study by Nolin4 suggests that between 80 to 90 percent of preadolescents 
and adolescents encounter physical and/or psychological bullying at some time 
during their school life.  Such figures show that bullying is a problem worldwide that 
creates negative lifelong consequences for both bullies and victims.5 
 
Like the United Kingdom, Australia is becoming a more litigious society. This includes 
a greater willingness on the part of persons who have sustained injury to seek to 
attribute legal responsibility for that injury to another, particularly where that other is 
perceived to be well resourced, including government entities or organisations 
supported by liability insurance, such as school authorities.  Adverse effects resulting 
from bullying have therefore been framed as damage resulting from a breach of duty 
by the school in failing to prevent such bullying.6 The result, in some cases, is a 
diversion of limited government resources or an increase in insurance in premiums.  
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Many if not most cases of alleged failure to prevent bullying, particularly those 
involving private schools, have been settled, perhaps through a desire of avoiding 
undesired publicity or the setting of unwanted precedent.  The cases that have 
reached a court decision have revealed the difficulties that may be associated with 
such claims.  Of course, school liability for bullying is but an instance of the broader 
issue of a school‟s duty of care, so that there are issues considered in non-bullying 
cases that may nevertheless still be relevant.  Added to the mix, a perceived 
insurance crisis in 2002 led to hastily drawn tort reform legislation in all eight 
Australian jurisdictions, which is not only not uniform but which may also have further 
complicated this type of personal injuries claim. This article will offer a critique of the 
current Australian position, drawing comparisons with the English position where 
appropriate. 
 
2. What is bullying behaviour? 
 
One difficulty that besets psychological studies of bullying at schools is that different 
researchers rely on different definitions of the behaviour they are studying.  Despite 
these inconsistencies, many definitions share common elements such as an intent to 
harm, provocation, repetition of behaviour, an imbalance of power, and impact on the 
victim.7  It is clear that initial thinking that may have been limited to acts of physical 
aggression has now been expanded to include verbal aggression, such as name 
calling, and aggression of a more psychological kind, such as deliberate exclusion 
and rumour spreading.8  Nevertheless, the view that to constitute bullying aggression 
must be repeated is not universal.  Rigby,9 a leading researcher in the field, points 
out that common usage permits bullying to be regarded as including single 
encounters.  Naturally, it might be observed that in other contexts, a single 
traumatising incident may result in psychiatric injury.   
 
One English judge accepted that bullying should be defined as unprovoked, intended 
to hurt and persisting over a period of time.10  However, it was noted on appeal that 
in law “there is no magic in the term bullying”.11  Thus, for example, Australian cases 
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have held a school to have breached its duty of care towards a student by an 
inadequate response to one-off instances of physical contact12 or physical fighting.13 
Some of these cases have referred to the contact in question as “bullying” 
notwithstanding the absence of the element of repetition commonly required by 
sociology or psychology researchers. 
 
It has been suggested that instances of bullying behaviour are better viewed as a 
continuum rather than all being of the same nature.  Variables that may be taken into 
account include the nature of the action (eg physical or mental), the duration (eg 
short or long time), and the frequency (eg weekly or more frequently).  Rigby14 
suggests that this enables bullying to be described in terms of: 
 
 Low severity – commonly involving thoughtless periodic teasing, name calling and 
occasional exclusion, and regarded as annoying and unpleasant. 
 Intermediate severity – victim is subjected, for a time, to forms of harassment that 
are both systematic and hurtful including cruel teasing, continual exclusion and 
some threats or other relative mild physical abuse eg pushing or tripping. 
 High severity - where the harassment is particularly cruel and intense especially if 
it occurs over an extended period and is very distressing to the victim, frequently 
involving serious physical assaults but may still be severe when the bullying is 
non-physical as in total or almost total exclusion from groups.  
 
The notion of a continuum of seriousness is valuable since having regard to only so-
called “real” acts may overlook behaviour that is nevertheless clearly undesirable and 
causing the target to suffer stress, anxiety and/or feelings of powerlessness. 
 
Technology has presented new opportunities for bullying.  So-called “cyberbullying”15 
may involve, for example, the use of email, mobile telephone calls, SMS text 
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messaging, chat rooms, web sites and “happy slapping”16. Technology, however, has 
attributes that may increase the impact of the behaviour.  These include anonymity, 
ease of access, size of audience, an increased sense of helplessness on the part of 
the victim, and the ability to reach the victim even when he or she is in a place 
previously considered safe, including home.  The use of technology also means an 
absence of non-verbal cues which ordinarily assist in determining whether behaviour 
is intended to be playful or hurtful. 
 
Bullies may act individually or in a group, while targets may also be individuals or 
groups.17   
 
3. Tort reform legislation in Australia 
 
In 2002 Australia experienced widespread dramatic increases in insurance rates.  
The increases threatened the viability of many activities including school fetes, pony 
rides and sporting activities.  While the media was replete with stories of a crisis 
befalling an insurance industry struggling to cope with the weight of excessive 
compensation awards, the increases were more likely due to factors which included 
the collapse of a major insurance company and of a medical insurance fund, both as 
a result of poor management practices, artificial suppression of insurance rates 
through undercharging by that insurance company, the financial after-effects of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks and a cyclical increase in premiums.18  Nevertheless, 
the Federal Government convened an inquiry chaired by Supreme Court judge 
Justice Ipp and also consisting of a legal academic, medical doctor and city mayor 
with the task of reviewing the law of negligence as it applied to personal injury claims. 
A preliminary report was due after only two weeks and a final report after only seven 
weeks, these periods to include all consultations and consideration of submissions.  
The task was made even more difficult for the panel by the absence of any empirical 
evidence produced by insurance companies to substantiate claims that the industry was 
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indeed in crisis.  The final report was devoid of any justified foundation, economic or 
otherwise, and instead expressly claimed to be “based primarily on the collective sense 
of fairness of [the four panel] members, informed by their knowledge and experience, by 
their researches and those of the Panel‟s secretariat”.19   
 
The panel‟s final report made a set of recommendations that could be enacted as 
uniform legislation by Australia‟s six States and two territories.  The result was been 
far from a uniform response, the recommendations only being enacted to varying 
degrees by the eight jurisdictions. Indeed, in some cases legislation has been 
enacted that is either contrary to the recommendations, or which is a variation or 
embellishment upon what was recommended. In addition, all jurisdictions have 
enacted reform measures which were not recommended by the panel.  The resulting 
is a hotchpotch of legislative provisions which present a challenge for anyone 
seeking to compare the law on a particular issue across the jurisdictions. 
 
3. Liability for students bullying students: some difficulties 
 
At common law an Australian school authority – which will be either a State or 
Territory in the case of a public school, or typically a church diocese, trust or 
incorporated company in the case of a private school – owes its pupils a non-
delegable duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken of them while they are on 
school premises at a time when the school is open for attendance.20  The school 
authority is obliged not only to employ proper staff but also to take reasonable care of 
the child.21  In the High Court of Australia it has been acknowledged that this duty 
“extends to protecting the pupil from the conduct of other pupils.”22   
 
The duty was once seen as arising by virtue of any implied delegation of authority 
from the parents.  Classic descriptions of the duty of a schoolmaster include that of 
Lord Esher: “such care … as a careful father would take of his boys”.23  However, this 
formulation has been criticised in the High Court as being unrealistic in the case of a 
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schoolmaster who has the charge of a school with some 400 children, or of a master 
who takes a class of 30 or more children.24  It is now recognised that rather than 
being based on any notion of the school authority or teacher being in loco parentis25 
in the case of a State/Territory authority the duty is based on the exercise of 
governmental power and setting up a system of compulsory education, while in the 
case of a private school authority it arises from the contractual arrangement between 
the school and the pupil‟s parents or guardian.26 The duty arises due to the potential 
for harm of those who may be vulnerable and due to the school authority assuming 
responsibility for the child‟s protection.27  This has implications for issues such as the 
standard of care expected from school authorities and teachers as trained 
professionals. 
 
The common law in Australia, like the United Kingdom, requires a plaintiff to show a 
duty of care, breach of the duty and resulting damage.  Liability for bullying raises 
issues relevant to each of these elements, as well as the defence of contributory 
negligence. 
 
Scope of the duty 
 
The scope of this duty is problematic.  It is not confined to school hours or to the start 
of the teachers‟ hours of employment at the school.  This is particularly significant if 
pupils are allowed to be in the school grounds prior to the time during which teachers 
are on classroom duty: in Australia the scope of the duty depends upon not so much 
the teacher‟s ability to effectively perform the duty as “whether in the particular 
circumstances the relationship of school teacher and pupil was or was not then in 
existence”.28  This test is intended in the meaning of whether in a temporal sense the 
relationship had arisen or ended for the particular day as opposed to, for example, 
whether the pupil was properly enrolled or not.  On this rationale, the duty is seen as 
extending to school activities that take place outside the school premises such as 
school excursions whether for educational, recreational or sporting purposes.  School 
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policies and procedures, including any prohibition on bullying, should therefore 
extend to such excursions.29   
 
However, perhaps the most difficult issue for schools in practice is in knowing how far 
they should intervene in other matters occurring beyond the school gate. An English 
judge once observed: “One can think of circumstances where [the duty] might go 
beyond [the school gates], for example if it were reasonable for a teacher to 
intervene when he saw one pupil attacking another immediately outside the school 
gates.”30  Nevertheless, in cases involving bullying on the way to or from school, 
British courts have found that either the incident occurred at a time when the student 
had “left the charge” of the school,31 or that the teacher involved had taken 
reasonable care in the circumstances.32 
 
There is also Australian authority recognising that liability in a case involving an 
incident after school hours and outside school premises. In the New South Wales 
case Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Bathurst v Koffman33 
the 12 year old plaintiff was struck in the eye with a stick while he was waiting to 
catch a bus home from school at a bus stop situated 400 metres from school 
grounds.  The plaintiff and his friend had been playing in a tree near the bus stop 
when they were pelted with sticks and rocks thrown by high school students. The 
incident was regarded as falling within the school‟s duty of care.  It was held that the 
extent and nature of the duty of the teacher to the pupil is dictated by the particular 
circumstances, rather than the ring of the school bell or the closing of the school 
gate.  While, for example, older children might leave the environs of a small country 
high school located on a quite street in comparative safety, young children leaving a 
primary school located on a busy highway in a big city, as occurred here, may 
confront a variety of dangers. For example, school busses and parents may arrive 
late, major streets may have to be crossed or, as in this case, high-spirited children 
may congregate outside the school waiting to be taken home.34  In the final result, 
Shellar JA (with whom Priestley JA) agreed that the trial judge had not erred in 
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finding that the circumstances the school authority had breached its common law 
duty due to its knowledge that its students routinely used the bus stop and because it 
ought to have known of the mischief that is likely when children of different ages and 
from different schools mix without adequate supervision. 
 
In that case Shellar JA also remarked obiter that depending on the circumstances a 
school authority‟s common law duty could extend to pupils on the journey on the bus 
or while they were walking to or from school. Thus, if the school authority “were 
aware … that on a particular journey older children habitually and violently bullied 
younger children, the duty may well extend so far as to require the school to take 
preventative steps or to warn parents. This duty would be founded in the relationship 
of teacher and pupil.”35  
 
The test of whether the relationship of school teacher and pupil was or was not in 
existence at the relevant time was first proposed in a case involving students who 
were allowed onto school grounds before official school hours and before supervision 
was available, primarily for safety reasons.36  The relationship was nonetheless found 
in that case due to the principal prescribing rules of conduct for the students involved 
(eg sit quietly, no playing of sports etc).  It may be true in Australia as in England that 
a “school cannot owe a general duty to its pupils, or any one else to police their 
activities once they have left its charge …that is principally the duty of parents and, 
where criminal offences are involved, the police.”37 However, where a school, 
perhaps through fears for the safety of its students at a particular bus, train or ferry 
stop – whether due to physical risk or perhaps risks associated with others who may 
frequent that stops – directs its students to use another, particular stop, it may be 
possible to argue that the school is prescribing the conduct of its students and 
thereby creating the relationship of schoolmaster and pupil such that a duty of care 
would be owed. 
 
It is suggested that this ought to be the approach to cases of cyberbullying, an issue 
yet to be considered by the Australian courts. Certain instances of such behaviour 
may occur within the scope of the school‟s duty.  For example, use of school 
computers to send offensive or aggressive emails or to be offensive or aggressive 
towards another student in a chatroom would be caught by the duty.  Similarly 
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students using mobile phones to SMS offensive or aggressive messages to a fellow 
student whilst on school premises or otherwise under school supervision would also 
be within the scope.  This should include where the recipient of the message or 
posting is at home.  In such cases, it would be reasonable to expect a school 
authority or teacher to, for example, implement appropriate policies such as banning 
the unauthorised use of mobile telephones on school premises or excursions and 
otherwise monitor the use of facilities like email and chatrooms so far as possible. 
Even then there may be some cases of cyberbullying that will be beyond the best 
endeavours of a reasonable school authority or teacher, such as bullying by omission 
including deliberate refusal by one or more students to respond or even acknowledge 
the chatroom postings of another student. The school authority should not be liable in 
such cases.  Further, instances of electronic communications occurring between 
students but not occurring on school premises or a school excursion should fall 
outside the school authority‟s duty and instead be the concern of parents, and if 
necessary, the police. 
 
Normal fortitude 
 
Bullying frequently results in psychological harm independent of bodily injury. In 
Australia, in a “primary victim” type relationship,38 the duty of care in such a case 
depends upon foreseeability of the risk of recognisable psychiatric illness being 
suffered by the plaintiff,39  not merely some form of personal injury, whether physical 
or psychological, as is currently the case in England.40 Further, the High Court in 
Tame v New South Wales has now rejected a requirement of normal fortitude as a 
pre-condition in all psychiatric injury claims.41 
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The Ipp inquiry had no specific term of reference concerning claims for psychiatric 
injury.  However, there were general terms of reference concerning the elements of 
the negligence action and the panel saw fit to make a number of recommendations 
limiting claims for mental harm.  One recommendation enacted by all Australian 
jurisdictions except Queensland and the Northern Territory was that there should be 
no duty of care not to cause pure mental harm (now described in the legislation as 
“recognised psychiatric illness”) unless, absent knowledge of particular susceptibility, 
the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might suffer 
psychiatric illness if care was not taken.42  The recommendation was purportedly 
intended to give effect to Tame v New South Wales which was handed down shortly 
before the inquiry was held43 but evidently represents a misreading of the case and in 
fact gives effect to the views of only two of the seven judges (McHugh and Callinan 
JJ). 
 
Normal fortitude is an inherently difficult concept, largely stemming from the fact that 
it is medically invalid: society is made up of people of varying susceptibilities and 
breaking points and no one person can be said to be “normal” or “average”. Little 
wonder, then, that where the court has taken evidence on the matter it has not ventured 
beyond psychiatrists giving evidence in the nature of ex cathedra assertions without 
any attempt at justification or explication,44 or to “normal fortitude” being a matter of 
judicial notice45 or now, in McHugh J‟s terms, an application of a community 
standard.46  Rather than leave the foreseeability of normal fortitude as a matter of 
unguided intuition, the Ipp panel recommended that the following factors should be 
taken into account: whether there was sudden shock; proximity to the scene; 
perception with unaided senses; any pre-existing relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant; and the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim killed, 
injured or imperilled. In other words, considerations which the High Court of Australia 
decided in Tame v New South Wales and later Gifford v Strang Stevedoring Ltd47 
were merely factors informing the reasonable foreseeability test, some of which are 
regarded in England as prerequisites to recovery, were appropriated by the panel to 
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serve as guidelines to its normal fortitude precondition. A major defect in this 
approach is that most of these factors are only relevant in so-called “secondary 
victim” cases, and have no relevance whatever to “primary victim” cases, which 
would include cases of children being bullied.  Only sudden shock and pre-existing 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant have any possible application to both 
secondary and primary victim scenarios, which is the likely reason that one of the six 
jurisdictions to have legislated, Tasmania, chose to only enact these two factors and 
not any of the others as the relevant guidelines.48  Even then existence of a pre-
existing relationship between the school and the bullied student adds nothing to the 
issue, while trying to pinpoint a single “shocking event” is inappropriate and unhelpful 
in a case like bullying which typically involves an accumulation of instances of 
objectionable behaviour.  
 
The value or otherwise of the guidelines aside, the statutes require proof as a 
precondition that it was reasonably foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude 
would suffer psychiatric injury in the circumstances, unless there is knowledge of 
susceptibility.  How is this requirement to be satisfied in the case of a child plaintiff?  
It is possible that infancy could be recognised as vulnerability in itself, so that the 
requirement would be satisfied in all cases involving the bullying of a child.  However 
this does not seem consistent with the intent of the legislation.  It would allow 
recovery by the meekest of children who might decompensate at the slightest brush 
with perceived hostility or horseplay.  Under the common law, which subsists in 
Queensland and the Northern Territory, such a case would be deemed to be outside 
the scope of reasonable foreseeability.  Since it would be unreasonable to expect a 
child to display the maturity of an adult, it would seem that the requisite "normal 
fortitude" should instead be the normal fortitude of a child of similar age and 
maturity.49  Support for this view might be found in Nader v Urban Transit Authority of 
New South Wales50 where the court made allowance for the fact that at 10 years old 
the plaintiff was unable to resist the influence of his family to adopt a sick role, while 
other cases have noted that on their facts the particular plaintiff was of “tender years” 
and have taken this fact into account in their determinations.51 
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However, this does not necessarily make the task any easier.  School years are 
formative years in terms of social interaction, and exposure to a certain degree of 
aggression may be considered to be beneficial and a part of natural development if the 
child is to develop into an adult who is able to cope with the pressures and demands 
associated with living in a modern society.  For example, it might be thought that a 
“normal child” should be expected to cope with bullying of a “low severity” as discussed 
above without decompensating.  In addition, as one judge observed in a different 
context, rough horseplay “symbolise[s] the play activities of teenagers, especially 
younger males.”52  There will be a point, however, where playfulness becomes 
unacceptable aggression.  This threshold, like a person‟s threshold of pain, is likely to 
differ from child to child.  However, even if it were possible to talk in terms of a “normal” 
child, perhaps reflecting an “average” reaction the issue remains problematic.  This is 
because it may well be the case (and empirical research may be required to confirm 
the point) the threshold of the amount of aggression that a child of “normal fortitude” 
might be expected to endure may differ according to the background and character of 
the person perceiving the behaviour and the context.  Thus it may be that the threshold 
according to, for example, a senior male teacher in an all boys school will be more 
tolerant and allow a higher degree of aggression than a newly graduated teacher in a 
co-educational school, for whom bullying and anti-bullying techniques may have 
formed part of his or her formal training.  When the one school has a mix of teachers, 
which view is to be taken as the school‟s view? 
 
Breach of duty 
 
There are, however, a number of recommendations that have been adopted by 
almost all jurisdictions. Three worth highlighting concern determination of breach of 
duty: the first changing the definition of “reasonable foreseeability”, the second 
reinforcing the common law approach to determining whether there is a breach of 
duty, and the third changing the method of determining the relevant standard of care. 
 
One of the triggers for the Ipp inquiry was a series of lower court decisions in which the 
plaintiff succeeded in circumstances indicating a failure by the plaintiff to take personal 
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responsibility for his or her actions.  The panel‟s report in this respect53 reflected an 
attitude that was common in legal circles that an explanation for these decisions was 
the definition of reasonable foreseeability, when determining whether there was a 
breach of duty, in terms of a risk that was “not far fetched or fanciful”.54  This enabled a 
court to expect a defendant to take precautions against a risk of very low probability 
merely because it was foreseeable. The panel addressed this problem by two 
recommendations. The first was to redefine reasonable foreseeable risk as a risk 
which is “not insignificant”.  The second was to reinforce the common law notion that 
breach of duty is a two tier inquiry: it must be the case both that the risk is reasonably 
foreseeable and that a reasonable person would have taken precautions in the 
circumstances.  Mere foreseeability of risk is not sufficient if a reasonable person would 
not have taken precautions.  Whether a reasonable person would have taken 
precautions depends upon the “negligence calculus” which involves an assessment of 
the probability that harm would occur absent care; the likely seriousness of that harm; 
the burden of taking precautions; and the social utility of the risk-creating activity. If 
these factors indicate that a reasonable person would have taken precautions in the 
circumstances the breach question will resolve to whether the defendant in fact 
exercised the appropriate standard of care. These recommendations have now been 
enacted in all jurisdictions except the Northern Territory.55  However, since the second 
recommendation only reflected the common law, it should already be in operation in 
this jurisdiction. 
 
The essential point underlying this two tier approach to breach of duty is that a school 
authority will not be in breach of its duty simply because bullying is reasonably 
foreseeable in the circumstances.  Thus, for example, in Australian Capital Territory 
Schools Authority v El Sheik56 the Full Court of the Federal Court accepted that while 
a school authority may have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect students from 
significantly violent behaviour or from prolonged unwelcome physical attention, it was 
not realistic that the duty extended to protecting an apparently normal 15 year old 
boy from receiving over a short period of time play fight kicks, even painful play fight 
kicks, from his friend.57 While the risk of injury from such “horseplay” may be 
reasonably foreseeable, an application of the negligence calculus showed that the 
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 Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (2002), 104-105. 
54
  Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
55
 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 42-43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B; Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 31-32; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas), s 11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B. 
56
 (2000) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-577. 
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 Ibid at 64,134. 
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preventative precautions that would have been required would not have implemented 
by a reasonable school authority.  As Wilcox J, with whom Spender and Higgins JJ, 
remarked: 
 
It would require an army of supervisors to prevent any incident that might give 
rise to a physical injury: an injury might be sustained from something as 
quick, simple and common as one pupil pushing or tripping up another ….  
Unless an educational authority was prepared to impose a degree of 
regimentation that would be likely to provoke adverse community reaction, it 
would be impossible for it to prevent such incidents occurring.  An educational 
authority can, and should prevent rough “horseplay” incidents going on for a 
significant time or escalating to a level of violence that is likely, under normal 
circumstances, to constitute a danger to life or limb: but it seems to me that it 
is all it can do.58 
 
How the standard of the skill and care of a reasonable school authority or teacher 
translates into practice naturally depends on the particular circumstances of the case.  
There will be cases where the expectation may be fairly clear, but others which do not 
easily yield an answer.  The duty may variously be discharged by proactive steps, such 
as the provision of proper supervision59 and implementation of appropriate policies and 
procedures,60 or reactive measures, including investigation of complaints, conducting 
interviews with the children and/or their parents, and taking disciplinary action as 
appropriate.61  Naturally, the development and adoption of such policies and 
procedures alone will normally not be enough if they are left to gather dust on 
shelves or remain hidden among the files on a computer hard drive.62  Any policy 
needs to be reinforced both by constant reminders to pupils and by implementation, 
including the taking of disciplinary action where necessary.  Indeed, many schools 
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 See, eg, Gray v State of New South Wales Unreported, NSWSC, Grove J, 27 February 
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have had success with so-called “zero-tolerance” policies which involve a remedial 
response to every instance of bullying behaviour, no matter the degree of 
seriousness.63 
 
However, as with all matters of fact and degree, there may be some cases where 
there is disagreement concerning the appropriate response. An excellent example is 
Warren v Haines64 where, during morning recess in an unsupervised area, a known 
bully picked up the plaintiff, a 15-year-old girl, and dropped her on her tailbone.  The 
plaintiff succeeded both at trial and appeal, although there were wide divisions in the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal.  Priestley JA thought the injury would have been 
prevented if there had been adequate supervision of the area where the incident took 
place.  By contrast, Glass JA held that while assigning a teacher to act as a 
permanent restraining influence on the boy would have exceeded the requirements 
of the duty of care, the precaution of detaining him in the classroom during the recess 
until his behaviour improved would have been a practical step which, if adopted, 
would probably have meant that at the time of the incident he would either have 
improved his conduct or would have been detained.  Either way the plaintiff would not 
have been subjected to the treatment which caused her injury.  The dissenting judge 
Samuels JA rejected both supervision and discipline as practical precautions. He 
thought that the argument that disciplining the bully during recess would have had 
the cumulative effect of eliminating his anti-social behaviour was entirely speculative.  
Supervision would probably not have deterred the bully‟s behaviour, which may have 
taken no more than 10 seconds to complete, since in that time the supervisor would 
probably not have been able by admonishing words to discourage or to physically 
intervene to prevent the plaintiff being picked up and dropped as she had been.  
When the thoughts of the trial judge – who thought that both supervision and 
discipline were necessary – the overall outcome was that two judges thought that 
supervision was needed, two thought that discipline was needed and two thought 
that neither supervision nor discipline would have been effective! 
 
The third recommendation related to the determination of the relevant standard of 
care in the circumstances.  The common law in Australia preceding the Ipp inquiry 
required the court to determine what would be required by an exercise of reasonable 
                                               
63
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care in the circumstances.  This could lead to a defendant being held liable, even 
where he or she had acted in accordance with, for example, responsible medical 
opinion.  In lieu of this position, the panel recommended the adoption of the English 
Bolam rule with a minor modification.65 This rule requires the court to defer to a 
“responsible body” of expert opinion, the panel adding the caveat “unless no 
reasonable court would do so.”  This recommendation was made law in six of the eight 
jurisdictions, although in all except one of these the rule was made applicable to all 
professionals, and not restricted to medical professionals.66  This would include 
teaching professionals.  Accordingly the duty will be to exercise the skill and care of a 
reasonable school authority, head teacher and/or teachers in accordance with what 
is seen as current teaching practices accepted by the teaching profession.   
 
It may well be that a case like Warren v Haines would benefit from an application of 
the Bolam approach,67 if there was an accepted best practice or policy recognised 
among the teaching profession for the handling of pupils who have the propensity for 
hurting other children, including their disposition during recess times.68  Expert 
professional opinion will no doubt be needed to formulate the expected kind of 
response to cyberbullying, including for example the monitoring of chat rooms and 
other computer usage and a ban on using mobile telephones during school hours or 
even, more drastically but certainly more effectively, the surrender of all mobile 
telephones while on school premises. 
 
Causation 
 
A study of 3918 New South Wales school children in grades 6 to 10 from 115 
government and non-government schools showed that bullying behaviour was 
associated with increased psychosomatic symptoms including, headache, stomach 
ache, backache, feeling low, irritable or bad temper, feeling nervous, difficulties 
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getting to sleep and feeling dizzy.69 Other difficulties reported as resulting from 
bullying include low self-esteem, low self-worth, depression, anxiety and loneliness,70 
psychosocial problems,71 physical and psychological harm, social isolation and poor 
adjustment to school.72 
 
However, there must be a causal link established between the alleged breach of duty 
and the particular damage.  As an English court remarked about cases involving 
bullying at school: 
 
[In] all these cases it is necessary to identify with some precision any breach 
of duty found.  It is also important to consider whether the steps proposed 
would have been effective in preventing the bullying.  It is not enough to find 
that there has been bullying, to find some breach of duty, and then to find that 
the bullying caused the injury.  There must be a causal connection between 
the breach of duty and the injury.  That will often be difficult to prove.73 
 
In Australia, the “but for” test for causation was enshrined in tort reform legislation in 
most jurisdictions.74  Accordingly the child plaintiff is required to show that any injury 
would not have been suffered but for the school‟s particular breach of duty.  It would 
be insufficient to merely identify a breach of duty such as a failure to supervise if the 
failure to supervise did not materially contribute to the injury. 
 
An additional issue concerning causation is that some of the common symptoms 
might reasonably be expected to be displayed by an adolescent as a result of a 
variety of causes, including simply those associated with growing up, rather than any 
bullying behaviour.  There may be a tendency, consciously or subconsciously, to 
attribute all ailments of a psychological or psychosomatic nature to the bullying.  
Accordingly, distinguishing between psychological or psychosomatic injuries linked to 
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the breach of duty and those resulting from other causes will be an important 
threshold task.75 
 
Contributory negligence 
 
If a school is to have any defence it will lie in contributory negligence.  The traditional 
test for contributory negligence is a failure to take reasonable precautions for one‟s 
own safety. It had been held that the standard of care in contributory negligence, like 
the standard of care in negligence, depended on foreseeability of a reasonable and 
prudent person.76   The test has now been modified in the six Australian States but 
not the two Territories by the tort reform enactments.  In the States a plaintiff‟s 
contributory negligence is now to be based on the same approach to a defendant‟s 
negligence, that is reasonable foreseeability of risk and the precautions a reasonable 
person would take (if any) to that risk, taking into account the “negligence calculus”.77  
The relevance of the foreseeability of a reasonable and prudent person has therefore 
been reinforced.   
 
The instances of the defence being raised against child plaintiffs are rare.78  The issue 
was, however, addressed in the District Court of South Australia in Copping v The 
State of South Australia,79 a case involving a 9 year old struck in the eye by a stone 
thrown by a 16 or 17 year old secondary student who had been provoked by younger 
students including the plaintiff during unsupervised recess time.  Robertson J held that 
that the “reasonable and prudent man” in that case was an ordinary child of 
comparable age to the plaintiff, namely a child of 9 years.  Here the plaintiff should 
have foreseen that one of the senior students would have responded as this senior 
did and that such a response may have caused injury.  In that event, the plaintiff in 
the exercise of taking reasonable care for his own safety should have left the 
immediate vicinity of where the younger students were throwing the stones.  The 
plaintiff failed to do so and was therefore held to be guilty of contributory 
negligence.80 
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However, application of a test based on the foreseeability of a child of comparable 
age may lead to different results.  In particular, the court should not lose sight of the 
particular pressures and influences that may affect such a child‟s judgment.  For 
example, in New South Wales v Griffin81 the 13-year old plaintiff was injured in a fight 
with another student.  The boys were seen arguing in Art class earlier that day and 
talk soon spread around the class and then the school that there would be a fight 
during recess.  A note to this effect was even written on the Art classroom 
whiteboard.  Counsel for the defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to exercise 
due care for his own safety by fighting when even as a 13 year old he knew that the 
fight was against school rules and that there was a real risk of being hurt. 
 
Ipp JA (with whom Giles and McColl JJA agreed) considered such thinking to be 
divorced from the reality of the situation and what should be expected of a 13 year 
old boy.  There was an excited expectation that the fight would take place which had 
permeated throughout the school. Peer pressure on the plaintiff must have been very 
strong.  Accordingly, to suggest in such circumstances that he would not turn up for 
the fight was “quite unreasonable” because he would have become notorious 
throughout the school and would have had to face the charge of cowardice.  Instead, 
the plaintiff„s behaviour fell within “the foreseeable folly of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
youthful exuberance.”82  At the same time, the dangers associated with boys fighting 
in the school yard were precisely the kind of risk against which a school authority 
must take reasonable steps to protect the plaintiff.83 
 
It may be easy in a particular case to regard a child‟s failure to even alert the school 
or parents that he or she is being bullied as a failure to take a reasonable precaution 
to a reasonably foreseeable risk, and therefore as constituting contributory 
negligence. However, care must be taken not to divorce this test from its proper 
context and to instead pay due recognition to the daily pressures which may help 
shape a child‟s view of what might be the appropriate course of action in the 
circumstances. 
 
4. Conclusion 
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The willingness of aggrieved students to bring actions against their schools or former 
schools based on alleged breach of their duty of care is an increasing phenomenon in 
Australia, just as it is in the United Kingdom.  Claims of failure to prevent bullying are 
one such area of growth.  Naturally, however, the mere fact that a student suffers injury 
does not mean that the school will automatically be liable.  Liability in bullying cases 
may involve one or more issues across the negligence equation, including the scope of 
the duty of care, normal fortitude of the plaintiff, the requisite standard of care, 
causation and contributory negligence.   
 
The Australian context has been altered by recent tort reform legislation.  In the case of 
some of the relevant issues, such as the expected standard of care, this has seen 
Australia adopting a position comparable to that prevailing in the United Kingdom.  In 
other respects, the law in the two countries is now divergent.  For example, in most 
Australian jurisdictions the need to show that the defendant could reasonably foresee 
that a person of normal fortitude would be injured in the circumstances, has now set 
courts the difficult task of determining the point at which aggressive behaviour directed 
at the plaintiff child goes beyond what may be regarded as healthy and formative and 
instead becomes damaging.  Taken as a whole, the legislative changes had the 
deliberate design of tilting the field more in favour of defendants.  As a consequence, 
victims of bullying at schools who may be powerless against their aggressors may find 
it more difficult to find any consolation in actions against their schools for failing to take 
steps to protect them from such behaviour. 
